Reassessing Neo-Kantianism.  Another Look at Hermann Cohen’s Kant Interpretation by Luft, Sebastian
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications Philosophy, Department of
4-1-2014
Reassessing Neo-Kantianism. Another Look at
Hermann Cohen’s Kant Interpretation
Sebastian Luft
Marquette University, sebastian.luft@marquette.edu
Published version. Philosophical Readings: Online Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2014):
90-114. Permalink. © 2014 Philosophical Readings. Published under Creative Commons License
CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 IT.
Miscellaneous Articles 
PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS   ISSUE VI – NUMBER 1 – SPRING 2014	  
Reassessing Neo-Kantianism. Another 
Look at Hermann Cohen’s Kant Interpre-
tation 
 
Sebastian Luft 
Marquette University 
 (USA) 
 
 
1.  Introduction: The Historical 
Background of the Marburg School 
and Hermann Cohen’s Contribution 
 
he life and works of Hermann 
Cohen are on various levels sym-
bolic for many aspects of Western 
intellectual history, being a Jew, a philoso-
pher, and living in a critical time on the 
European continent, Germany more pre-
cisely, and being more than an observer but 
instead someone who made a significant 
mark on this epoch. Though largely forgot-
ten today, he was one of the most outstanding 
intellectuals in Europe around 1900. Studying 
his life and his thought helps us reconstruct a 
fascinating epoch in Western history. A brief 
historical consideration will be useful to ap-
proach his specifically philosophical contribu-
tion. 
Hermann Cohen was born in 1842 in 
Coswig (State of Anhalt) into an orthodox 
Jewish family. Besides attending the German 
Gymnasium he also went to a Hebrew school 
and maintained his Jewish ties over the years, 
until at the end of his philosophical journey 
he even attempted to reconstruct the origins 
of Enlightenment moral philosophy out of 
the sources of Judaism.1 His Jewish identity 
was woven into his life as well as his philoso-
phy.2 However, he felt very much as a Jewish 
German and came to be a vehement oppo-
nent of assimilation and, an energetic, irrita-
ble personality, despised converts who ne-
glected or even denied their Jewish origins 
(such as, e.g., Edmund Husserl3). Dismayed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For historical details about Cohen’s life, cf. Holz-
hey’s works in Holzhey 2004 and Politisches Denken, 
pp. 15-36. One should mention that Cohen’s views 
on Jewish identity changed over the years. In his 
early years, he was rather indifferent to his Jewish 
origins but was forced to take a stand on this issue. 
Especially after his involvement in the Treitschke 
affair, he shifted from the idea of assimilation to 
promoting a proliferation of Jewish customs and 
traditions within a society that was not allowing 
Jews to assimilate. 
2 Especially Cassirer makes this point in his writings 
on his teacher, also increasingly in Cassirer’s later 
writings. Cf. Cassirer 2001. 
3 There is evidence for this in some letters from and 
about Cohen, where he speaks unfavorably about 
Husserl. In a letter to Natorp of August 23, 1914, he 
writes: “Der oesterreichische Konvertit ist auch so 
eine geschwollene Eitelkeitsfigur, ohne Aufrichtig-
keit & Wahrhaftigkeit.” (Quoted in: H. Holzhey, 
Cohen und Natorp, Vol. 2, p. 430). Cohen makes this 
statement in the context of his fight against anti-
Semitism on the part of the Jewish community, 
which has to become, he believes, more “positive” 
(ibid.), instead of, as the Husserls, denying their 
Jewish origins (Husserl and his wife had converted 
to Christianity and were overall quite secular). Ac-
cording to Karl Schuhmann, with whom the author 
discussed this passage, there can be no doubt that it 
is Husserl that Cohen is referring to in this passage. 
Cf. also ibid., pp. 369 f. (Cohen’s letter to Natorp of 
December 1908), where he warns Natorp of Husserl 	  
T 
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and frustrated by anti-Semitic experiences 
both as a citizen as well as an academic 
throughout his lifetime, he came to ponder, 
and ultimately reject, Theodor Herzl’s idea of 
a Jewish State. The Jewish cause became so 
dear to him that, upon retiring from Marburg 
in 1912, Cohen moved to Berlin where he 
taught at the School of the Study of Judaism, 
where he was influential for a young genera-
tion of Jewish theoreticians such as Franz 
Rosenzweig and Martin Buber. Being critical 
of the idea Zionism,4 he always felt a part of 
German intellectual life, to which he made an 
invaluable contribution with his philosophical 
works.  
Yet Cohen was also an outspoken public 
intellectual who commented publicly on is-
sues pertaining to his religion. He became 
known to a larger audience in Germany when 
he took a stance against Heinrich von Tre-
itschke in the famous “Judenstreit.”5 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and suggests “einige Reserve und nicht vollkom-
mene Vertrauensseligkeit” (p. 370). Husserl, on his 
part, conspicuously ignored Cohen, while he was 
exceptionally friendly with Natorp. 
4 The idea that was floated at the time was the Brit-
ish suggestion to offer Uganda, a former colony, for 
Jews to settle. This idea was rejected especially by 
the Zionists like Herzl, to whom the only site of a 
Jewish State could be Palestine.  
5 In his anti-Semitic pamphlets, Treitschke claimed 
that the Jews could never be a part of German cul-
ture. More specific hate speech was later directed at 
Jewish neo-Kantians such as Cohen himself, who 
was attacked by the main editor of Kantstudien, 
Bruno Bauch, for being unable to understand Kant 
as a non-German. The fight that ensued after this 
attack—the counter-attack came from Cassirer—
led Bauch to resign from his editorship of 	  
tragedy of so many Jews of his generation 
was the realization that they were simply not 
allowed and welcome to assimilate them-
selves in a country they loved and to which 
they felt a strong sense of belonging. Cohen 
died in 1918 amidst the rubble of the Great 
War, poring over the proofs of his great 
work on the philosophy of religion (Religion 
of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, pub-
lished posthumously in 1919, edited by 
Rosenzweig and Cassirer) and with the plans 
in his mind to finish his philosophical system 
culminating with a work on psychology, con-
ceived as a science of the “unity of cultural 
consciousness” (“Einheit des Kultur-
bewusstseins”), the topic that was at the heart 
of his philosophical endeavors. One late and 
tragic irony is that his wife, Martha Cohen, 
who survived her husband by more than two 
decades, was deported to the Concentration 
Camp in Theresienstadt in 1942, where she 
fell victim to the Nazi regime within days of 
her arrival. 
Cohen was not the first neo-Kantian in 
Marburg, though he is, and with good rea-
sons, considered the founder of the “Marburg 
School.” He was lured to Marburg in 1873 by 
his predecessor Friedrich Albert Lange, who 
had become famous through his History of 
Materialism (Geschichte des Materialismus, 
1866) that was considered one of the found-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kantstudien. However, he later, after Hitler’s sei-
zure of power, became an avid Nazi. All of these 
connections are laid out in great detail in Sieg’s de-
finitive historical study on the Marburg School. 
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ing works of the neo-Kantian movement.6 
Due to Cohen’s first major work, entitled 
Kant’s Theory of Experience (Kants Theorie der 
Erfahrung, 1st ed.1871), which was well-
received at the time and quickly became a 
classic of Kant scholarship, Cohen gained a 
reputation for being a penetrating and pro-
found Kant scholar, but also an original 
thinker. Publishing a number of works on 
Kant, but also on other philosophers (ancient 
and early modern) quickly and in short suc-
cession, he was subsequently offered a per-
manent position in Marburg in 1876 and soon 
gained a nationwide reputation as a philoso-
pher succeeding in Lange’s footsteps, al-
though with an entirely different philosophi-
cal agenda.7 Cohen’s reputation grew enor-
mously within the next decade and, with the 
younger Paul Natorp receiving a funded po-
sition in 1882, was seen as the founder as well 
as the head of the emerging “Marburg 
School.” It is fair to say that he was one of the 
most influential and well-known academic 
philosophers in Germany at the end of the 
19th Century.8 The Marburg School as a com-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 More famous than the actual content of the work 
was the fact that each chapter, by laying out the im-
portance of Kant’s philosophy, ended with the pas-
sionate expression “Daher muss zu Kant zurückge-
gangen warden!” (“This is why we must go back to 
Kant!”). Again one can draw the analogy to the 
phenomenological movement in its “battle cry” “Zu 
den Dingen selbst!” (“To the things themselves!”). 
7 To be precise, Cohen took over Lange’s chair that 
had become vacant due to Lange’s death in 1875. 
8 It is clear that we are talking here about the phi-
losophical scene within the academe. Arguably 
more famous at the time were “popular” non-	  
plex philosophical movement with a clear 
philosophical agenda reached its peak around 
1900 as well.9  
Cohen’s reputation mainly owed to his 
personal aura and powerful classroom per-
sona. Also in his writings, one gets the im-
pression of an original, deep thinker who 
moves quickly from seemingly minute details 
to raising the most fundamental questions 
and who writes in a deeply passionate, com-
mitted manner that is at all times highly cap-
tivating.10 Analogies to Martin Heidegger’s 
classroom presence, incidentally also first 
displayed in Marburg, have been drawn.11 He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
academic philosophers such as Kierkegaard, 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Willey (1987) has 
made the interesting connection between 
Nietzsche’s and Cohen’s philosophical intentions. 
For an historical account of the development of the 
Marburg School, cf. also Sieg 1994. 
9 Sieg (1994, p. 190) has called the time between 
1900 and 1910 the “golden era” of the Marburg 
School. 
10 As of ca. 1900, Cohen suffered from an eye disease 
that made him unable to read and write on his own. 
His wife, Martha, read things out loud for him and 
also penned down what her husband dictated to her. 
One immediately notices this “spoken language” 
style in his later writings and the passion with which 
these texts must have been dictated is very explicit. 
11 Cf. Brandt, 1992. One could speculate that the fact 
that Heidegger was able to build such a strong repu-
tation in Marburg was (in part at least) due to the 
fact that there was a fertile ground in the student 
body for him to launch his career. After all, by the 
time Heidegger came, Marburg as a whole (not just 
the Philosophy Department) was still considered a 
very active university, bustling with students from 
as far away as Russia and Japan. Moreover, Natorp, 
who was by all accounts a very modest, quiet and 	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soon attracted many students, also from 
abroad, in what was to become one of the 
centers of neo-Kantianism, next to the two 
university towns in Southwest Germany, 
Freiburg and Heidelberg. Neo-Kantianism 
had at that time (around 1900), as Jürgen 
Habermas puts it, an “imperial stance” in the 
philosophical scene of Germany (as well as, 
to a lesser extent, France, Italy and Spain). In 
this outstanding role, Cohen also attracted 
philosophers who would join him in his 
cause, most importantly the already men-
tioned Natorp, who arrived in Marburg in 
1881. Ernst Cassirer came to Marburg as a 
student from Berlin in the 1890s and, though 
he never taught at Marburg, nevertheless was 
considered—and considered himself—an 
offspring of the Marburg School.12 It was as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
shy person, was never able to fill the vacuum that 
the ebullient Cohen left behind upon his departure 
from Marburg in 1913. Another “Marburger” was 
Nicolai Hartmann, who had at that time also broken 
with the main tenets of the Marburg Method. So 
perhaps the students were waiting for a new 
“prophet”? 
12 Though the most famous members of the Mar-
burg School were these three thinkers upon which I 
focus here, there were at least another dozen phi-
losophers in this context that have become forgotten 
today but who were active within this movement. 
The character of this school becomes clear in its 
workings, if one sees it almost as a big factory with 
a clear division of labor. The member of this school 
worked on items ranging from theoretical, practical 
and aesthetical philosophy to philosophy of law and, 
last not least (and representing one of the staples of 
neo-Kantianism), Kant commentary and Kant 
scholarship in the form of Kant philology (editions 	  
of the 1880s that one has spoken of the “Mar-
burg School of neo-Kantianism”—an image 
that the Marburgers were keen on promot-
ing.13 With Cohen’s departure to Berlin after 
his retirement in 1912 and Natorp’s passing 
away in 1924, the character and image of a 
Schulgemeinschaft had vanished. As has been 
asserted14, however, the Marburg School of 
neo-Kantianism was one of the most “com-
pact” philosophical schools ever to exist in 
Germany. Whether this school was a typical 
phenomenon of the Kaiserreich and was “ob-
solete” by the time the Weimar Republic was 
established, is a question for historians, not 
philosophers, who attempt to take their 
thoughts seriously. No matter how timely 
neo-Kantian thought might be today, it is 
undoubtedly the case that this movement 
paved the way for most tendencies to emerge 
in the 20th Century. Simply in terms of his-
tory of effects, one cannot ignore neo-
Kantianism when one is committed to his-
torically responsible scholarship.  
Neo-Kantianism arose as of the 1870s in 
Germany with the battle cry “Back to Kant!” 
Interestingly, this call was first issued not by 
philosophers who were still, as it were, in a 
state of shock after the much-quoted “col-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Kant’s works) and journals (Kantstudien and Lo-
gos). 
13 While Natorp staid put for the most part in Mar-
burg and worked in quiet solitude, Cohen went on 
extensive travels during the semester breaks. Holz-
hey has also spoken of Cohen as the “Minister of the 
Exterior,” Natorp as the “Minister of the Interior” 
of the Marburg School. 
14 Cf. Holzhey, 1986/I. 
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lapse of German Idealism.” Instead, the call 
came from cutting-edge scientists such as 
Helmholtz15 who, in the midst of the sciences’ 
impressive achievements through novel ex-
perimental methods, sought guidance in 
questions concerning the epistemological 
foundations of scientific cognition. In this 
quest, they turned to the founder of critical 
philosophy, bypassing the overly speculative 
Naturphilosophie of the German Idealists (esp. 
Schelling). As is known, Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy rephrased the question of cogni-
tion in terms of subjective conditions of pos-
sibility of knowledge by proposing the notion 
that we can only know of things what we 
ourselves put into them. This new foundation 
of epistemology after the Copernican turn, so 
it seemed, could be utilized in principle but 
had to be transformed so as to be adequate to 
assess the problems of the day. Most impor-
tantly, it was Kant’s transcendental a priori 
that was the main source of inspiration; yet 
Helmholtz transformed and interpreted it in a 
physiological, essentially psychologistic, 
manner. This was Helmholtz’s reading of 
Kant, namely that the way of the human be-
ing’s experiencing contributed to that which 
was perceived: But forms of intuition were no 
longer of a transcendental nature in Kant’s 
sense (as conditions of possibility of objective 
knowledge), but were now seen as physio-
logical traits of the human being with its bod-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 On the side of academic philosophy one would 
also have to mention Herbart, Fries and Beneke, cf. 
Stolzenberg, p. 24. 
ily sensorial apparatus.16 This brings about 
the specter of psychologism that seemed to 
occupy much of philosophers’ efforts in the 
latter third of the 19th century. In a general 
sense, psychologism was the view that cogni-
tion depended on the human being’s psyche 
in its particular form of hardwiring. This has 
consequences for the role of philosophy itself; 
whatever it may be, it is clear what it can no 
longer lay claim to: to be a first philosophy 
with the function of providing a foundation 
for the sciences as second philosophies. Ret-
rospectively, we now see mainly Husserl as 
involved in this battle; however, Husserl was 
actually rather “late” in this general battle 
that was waged over philosophy’s character 
as scientific. As Natorp laconically comments 
in his review of Husserl’s Prolegomena of 
1900, the neo-Kantians enthusiastically wel-
come Husserl’s refutation of psychologism—
another refutation will hopefully help us to 
finally overcome this wrong-headed under-
standing of epistemology’s task—but that the 
Marburg School actually “could not learn 
much” from this. Husserl had merely, 
through his own trials and tribulations, come 
to see the light from his angle.17 
Ironically, thus, the origins of neo-
Kantianism lie in a “materialistic” (Lange), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The text that one refers to in this context is Helm-
holtz’s talk “Ueber das Sehen des Menschen” (“On 
Man’s Seeing”), delivered in Königsberg in 1855. 
Cf. Hatfield, who explores and reconstructs Helm-
holtz’s transformation of Kant’s transcendental phi-
losophy into a psychologistic reading. 
17 Natorp notes this several times, esp. in his review 
of Ideas I. 
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psychologistic rendering of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy. Cohen himself in his early works 
contributed to this reading in articles where 
he expounds his psychological research (in a 
journal dedicated to studies in “Folk Psy-
chology”18). It is not until his theoretical 
work on Kant after entering the debate con-
cerning the famous “third alternative” debate 
between Kuno Fischer and Adolf Trendelen-
burg19 that Cohen overcomes this psycholo-
gistic reading, being highly critical of his ear-
lier stance. As of 1871, thus, Cohen in his 
“critical” reading wages a vicious battle 
against psychologism. The “objective” and 
“logical” tendency—or over-emphasis, as 
has been asserted—of neo-Kantianism can be 
explained through the opposition against any 
form of psychologism. This is the origin and 
distinctive trait of the Marburg School in 
which it soon found allies in the Southwest as 
well as in Dilthey and the arising Phenome-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The full title of this journal was “Zeitschrift für 
Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft” (Jour-
nal for Folk Psychology and Linguistics); cf. Holz-
hey 2004, p. 44. 
19 In short, the “third alternative” reading that 
Trendelenburg proposes makes the point that Kant 
did not rule out that between an “idealistic” and 
“realistic” reading of Kant’s doctrine of the appear-
ances in space and time (as forms of intuition) and 
the thing in itself there could be a third alternative. 
This alternative is the idea that one cannot rule out 
that the thing in itself actually conformed to our 
way of thinking, that space and time are equally 
forms of intuition as well as categories of the thing 
in itself. For a summary of this argument and its 
consequences, cf. Gardner, 1999, p. 107-111. 
nological Movement.20 Yet, the close ties to 
the sciences of their day—psychology and 
natural science—were to become a trade-
mark of the Marburg School, to the extent 
that the Marburg Interpretation was even 
perceived by some as a mere “theory of sci-
ence.” This is echoed in the harsh verdict in 
the famous critique of, e.g., Heidegger, who 
claimed that in neo-Kantianism philosophy 
was demoted to “the handmaiden of the sci-
ences.”21 This critique proved devastating for 
the reputation of neo-Kantianism and has 
since been repeated like a mantra in philoso-
phical historiography.22 The way in which I 
will present the Marburg School inaugurated 
by Cohen will reveal this verdict to be wrong 
as well as wrong-headed on several counts. 
Criticizing this erroneous view of the Mar-
burg School makes way for a crucial under-
standing and appreciation of this school. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is interesting to note that Husserl underwent the 
same development as Cohen. In his first publication, 
the Philosophy of Arithmetic in 1891, Husserl took a 
psychologistic attitude with regard to the “constitu-
tion” of mathematical entities, only to harshly refute 
his own psychologism in the famous first volume of 
the Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena.  
21 Historically, this is actually an echo of Max 
Scheler’s earlier critique of neo-Kantianism in his 
habilitation thesis (and first book), entitled Phe-
nomenology and Epistemology. There, Scheler comes 
to the conclusion that the neo-Kantians consider 
philosophy as merely an “owl of Minerva.” Cf. 
Scheler, and Edel, pp. 120 f., esp. 121, fn. 11. For 
Heidegger’s view of neo-Kantianism, cf. the Davos 
Debate in Heidegger 1997, pp. 193 f. 
22 See, e.g., (Gardner 1999, p. 342), where this ver-
dict is again repeated almost as a matter of course 
and without any reference. 
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Cohen’s philosophical development as of 
his first “critical” work on Kant hence cen-
tered upon an elucidation of Kant’s Critiques, 
proceeding with a rather sophisticated, yet 
highly reflected, approach as a mix of eluci-
dation and interpretation. As he says already 
in the first edition of Kant’s Theory of Experi-
ence, he sees his work as a “combination of 
the systematic and historical task,”23 while 
being true to the “letter of Kant” and not shy-
ing away from the “dirty work” (Kärrnerar-
beit) of Kant philology. This approach ele-
vated Kant scholarship to a new level. By the 
1870s, more than half a decade after Kant’s 
death, Kant could be seen as a classic and the 
neo-Kantians introduced a new style of deal-
ing with Kant, witnessed also by emerging 
Kant commentaries and critical editions of 
Kant’s works.24 Being true to the spirit as well 
as the letter, however, could mean acknowl-
edging that Kant was clearly mistaken on cer-
tain accounts and needed to be corrected or 
overcome, precisely by remaining true to the 
spirit of Kant. In all of his interpretations of 
Kant, Cohen applies the hermeneutical prin-
ciple, to be found in the First Critique, of un-
derstanding the author better than he under-
stood himself. But this has consequences for 
the interpreter as well; dealing with Kant phi-
losophically required taking a stance (Parte-
inahme) on Kant. Remaining true to Kant 
could mean refuting his claims, while remain-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 KTE1, p. X. 
24 The commentaries on Kant that were published in 
this time are to this day classical works on Kant. I 
mention only the works by Hans Vaihinger and 
Kuno Fischer. 
ing within the horizons of his philosophy. Yet 
such a stance will be telling with respect to 
the critic as well: “One cannot pass judgment 
on Kant, without revealing in each and every 
line which world one carries around in one’s 
own head.”25 A combination of such a his-
torical and systematic inquiry renders 
Cohen’s critical-interpretative work on Kant, 
as he calls it, a “Metacritique.”26 Thus it is 
clear that from the outset Cohen engages in a 
highly reflected methodology of dealing with 
Kant and the accomplishments of his philoso-
phy that are seen in the light of contemporary 
problems, e.g., in the sciences. As Gadamer 
would later say, a successful interpretation of 
a classical author means an application to 
one’s own understanding and one’s own time. 
This principle is already applied with explicit 
consciousness by Cohen. 
Soon after Cohen’s work on the First Cri-
tique followed one on the Second and, 
somewhat later, on the Third Critique. Espe-
cially the works on the first two Critiques 
have become classics in Kant scholarship and 
at the same time have been, rightfully, con-
sidered highly difficult and complex works. 
Especially Kants Theorie der Erfahrung un-
derwent extensive expansion. While the first 
edition was a booklet of 270 pages, the second 
edition of 1885 was blown up to more than 
600 and the last edition of 1918 nearly 800 
pages! These works are difficult to assess in 
their systematic content, as they present the 
reader with an intricate mixture of a line-by-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 KTE1, p. XI. 
26 Ibid., p. XII. 
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line interpretation of the Critiques as well as 
critical reinterpretations of Kantian doctrines 
that quickly depart from the interpretative 
passages. It is sometimes not clear where 
Cohen paraphrases Kant and where he goes 
beyond him, yet while remaining close to the 
text and offering a barrage of quotations in 
support of his point. At the same time, all of 
Cohen’s writings display a superb grasp of 
the totality of Kant’s oeuvre. As Cassirer re-
counts anecdotally, when he first heard the 
name Cohen mentioned in the lectures that 
he followed with Georg Simmel in Berlin, 
Cohen was mentioned as an author whose 
works on Kant were recommended as being 
of exceptional depth and originality. Simmel 
went on to mention their difficulty and 
pointed out that, thankfully, there were 
commentaries on these books, namely Kant’s 
three Critiques!27 Increasingly, however, 
Cohen moved away from Kant and devel-
oped his own philosophical system that he 
also conceived in analogy to Kant’s three ma-
jor works, while in his latest phase he focused 
on the philosophy of religion, in which he 
worked on a philosophical interpretation of 
Judaism’s import for moral philosophy. 
Regardless of Cohen’s own philosophical 
system and its merits, it is the Kant interpre-
tation itself that has become the trademark of 
the Marburg School as a whole. This inter-
pretation goes beyond Kant to the extent that 
some even referred to the Marburg reading as 
a “neo-Fichteanism.”28 The main thesis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Cf. Cassirer, 2001. 
28 There was a plethora of other designations for the 
neo-Kantian tendency as a whole (including the 	  
Cohen’s interpretation is stated boldly in the 
title of Cohen’s book on the first Critique, 
that is, Kant’s transcendental philosophy is a 
novel theory of experience, with experience be-
ing mainly—though not exclusively—that 
experience ascertained in the natural-
mathematical sciences. From the standpoint 
of transcendental philosophy, the nature that 
we experience is given in natural science. 
“What nature may really be does not matter 
to us as long as we want to philosophize, not 
write poetry.”29 Secondly, what is crucial and 
of highest importance in this theory is Kant’s 
method. This method Cohen calls the tran-
scendental method, a term actually not itself 
utilized by Kant himself30. The way Cohen 
interprets this allegedly Kantian method soon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Southwest School), but none of these really “stuck.” 
On the other hand, the neo-Kantians very much 
conceived of themselves as a “school” and unified 
“movement,” which explains that the global label 
“neo-Kantianism” came to be used by themselves 
and was clearly intended as a form of self-
promotion, whereas a closer look reveals quickly 
how each of these highly original thinkers was 
working on his own project. In view of the diversity 
within the neo-Kantian movement, however, the 
Marburg School was indeed the most “compact” to 
the point that differences were deliberately sup-
pressed. See Holzhey’s Cohen und Natorp (Vol. I), 
where these differences are clearly indicated and 
spelled out. 
29 Quoted in Holzhey 2004, p. 47 (from Cohen’s 
programmatic preface to his edition of Lange’s His-
tory of Materialism). The phrase is difficult to trans-
late, thus here the original: “Was Natur sei, das geht 
uns nichts an, sofern wir philosophieren, nicht dichten 
wollen.” 
30 Cf. Baum, 1980. 
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reveals an original understanding of it that is 
both a radical reading of Kant as well as it ul-
timately departs from Kant’s scope, with the 
intention of “fixing” what in Kant was only 
darkly anticipated. What Kant means by ex-
perience is something more fundamental, or 
more encompassing, than the two elements 
that make cognition possible, sensibility and 
understanding.  
Moreover, part of this method—which 
was in fact highly contested—is to take the 
analytical path of the Critique that Kant pre-
sents in the Prolegomena, taking one’s point 
of departure from already established facts. 
And there is a reason for this. One needs to 
start from an already presupposed factum be-
cause this factum is not simply given but 
given as a problem or task that critical phi-
losophy deals with. The factum is not gege-
ben, but aufgegeben. The factum that presents 
us with the most problems is the factum of 
the sciences. This is the systematic reason 
why the Transcendental Method starts out 
with the factum of the sciences, not as some-
thing simply given but as a problem to be ex-
plained. Or as Cohen likes to say, the factum 
is not a terminus ad quem—something that we 
must arrive at ultimately—but as a terminus a 
quo—something from which philosophy 
must take its point of departure. It is the ex-
planandum, not the explanans. The “hand 
maiden” critique refers to this opening move, 
and thereby already misunderstands it com-
pletely. It is not that critical philosophy con-
tents itself with coming after the fact, the fac-
tum; rather, this is the starting point of the 
whole enterprise. The factum is not left un-
questioned, to the contrary: it is an endless 
task. 
Yet, taking the point of departure from 
scientific cognition also secures the scientific 
character of philosophy itself. Philosophy it-
self can only have a scientific character if the 
object it deals with is scientific as well. There 
is an internal connection between philoso-
phy’s role as first science and the natural sci-
ences as of Newton. The overall bold claim is 
that experience, in the way it is understood 
by Kant in the First Critique, is to be found in 
mathematical natural science and as such con-
structs reality, while taking its cue mainly 
from experience and cognition in the positive 
sciences. Reality, in the sense that Cohen un-
derstands it, is ultimately a construction in 
pure thought. Reality that we are to deal 
with, if we philosophize and not indulge in 
poetry, is purely logical and structured by 
laws. It is for these reasons that the Marburg 
School has also been characterized as a “pan-
logism” or “logical idealism.”31 The tran-
scendental method developed by Cohen by 
way of his Kant interpretation is the guiding 
clue to the Marburg School as a whole. While 
it has been modified and applied in different 
aspects by Natorp and Cassirer; their phi-
losophical efforts are incomprehensible with-
out this methodological groundwork laid by 
Cohen.  
This “logical” reading of Kant is incon-
ceivable, however, without first understand-
ing how Cohen views the purpose and con-
cept of philosophy and its role both vis-à-vis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Cf. Holzhey, as well as Gadamer, 1954. 
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as well as within, cultural life at large. Thus, 
before I present Cohen’s theoretical philoso-
phy focusing on the transcendental method as 
it arises from his Kant interpretation, I will 
first lay out his broader of what philosophy is 
to accomplish. In this understanding, he has a 
remarkably broad view; critical philosophy 
might have been invented by Kant, but Kant 
is merely reformulating philosophy’s task in 
light of the new developments in modern sci-
ence following Newton’s innovations. The 
transcendental method that Kant develops, 
the way Cohen reconstructs Kant’s inten-
tions, is incomprehensible without first clari-
fying Cohen’s own understanding of critical 
philosophy. Only then is the systematic 
framework provided within which the tran-
scendental method can be couched.  
 
 
2.  Cohen’s Concept of Philosophy as 
“Foundational Science” (“Grundle-
gungswissenschaft”) 
 
o appreciate the impetus of Cohen’s 
philosophy one has to expound first 
his concept of philosophy and, con-
versely, what view he is battling, philosophy 
as psychologism. After overcoming the psy-
chologistic reading of transcendental phi-
losophy, he wants to give philosophy back its 
original meaning of metaphysics as first phi-
losophy, but in a new guise and as standing 
on the ground laid by Kant’s Copernican 
turn. Kant merely rephrases the spirit of 
Western philosophy at the zenith of the En-
lightenment. Already in Antiquity and reborn 
in the Renaissance, philosophy stands in the 
midst of a culture, thereby in culture’s center. 
Yet within cultural activities, the sciences are 
culture’s pinnacle, the highest and most dig-
nified achievement of a cultural humanity. 
Philosophy, as first science, has an inherent 
connection to culture and its science and can-
not be understood without it. So how can one 
reconstruct the emergence of philosophy and 
science within a culture? 
Culture comes out of nature, but as such 
arises first as a study of nature. This is possi-
ble because the fascinating discovery in 
Greek Enlightenment is that our mind, e.g., 
in doing mathematics, conforms to nature. As 
Cohen says, “the first direction of culture is 
the science of nature. The latter begins with 
mathematics: in astronomy we have the com-
bination of mathematics and nature.”32 But by 
establishing itself as such a study of nature, 
culture arises as a world of its own, parallel to 
the world of nature, with its own forms of life 
in distinction from nature: religion, law, art. 
Consequently, there arise studies (sciences) 
of the cultural world as well: study of relig-
ion, of law, of politics, even of art. This is the 
broad understanding of science as episteme—
study in its basic sense—which Cohen pre-
supposes here as well as in his reconstruction 
of modern philosophy. Thus, parallel to natu-
ral science, a novel concept of science is cre-
ated, sciences of and within culture. In flour-
ishing cultures, such as the Greek, ever new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “Die vornehmlichste Cultur-Richtung ist die 
Wissenschaft der Natur. Diese beginnt mit der 
Mathematik in der Astronomie liegt die Verbindung 
von Mathematik und Natur vor.“ (Beinecke, Cas-
sirer papers, B 56, F 1107) 
T 
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sciences arise of ever new cultural forma-
tions. It is now the task of the philosopher33 
to reflect upon these manifold forms of sci-
ence—of episteme—and find their common 
traits as actions that are of the highest dignity 
in humanity, for otherwise there would be no 
unity, no focus in a given culture. “This one 
basic factum—the multiplicity [Vieldeutig-
keit] of the concept of science in culture—
proves the necessity of philosophy. This is 
the meaning of philosophy, that it overcomes 
this multiplicity, that it brings the concept of 
science to a principal definition, that it deter-
mines the constant factor of science in all its 
different directions. That means that philoso-
phy is the reconstruction of culture in all its 
directions from out of this constant factor of 
science.”34 
Philosophy as “reconstruction of culture” 
is the guiding clue that runs through the 
Marburg School as a whole. If one does not 
understand this approach as the most impor-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In this context, Cohen mentions Socrates’ famous 
saying that nature had nothing to teach him and that 
he preferred going into the marketplace to converse 
with his fellow citizens. Cohen interprets this as 
Plato’s shift from science as natural science to sci-
ence as a study of human culture. 
34 “Diese eine Grundfactum – die Vieldeutigkeit des 
Begriffs der Wissenschaft in der Cultur – beweist 
die Notwendigkeit der Philosophie. Das bedeutet 
die Philosophie, dass sie diese Vieldeutigkeit auf-
hebt, den Begriff der Wissenschaft zur prinzipiellen 
Bestimmung bringt, den constanten Factor der Wis-
sensachaft in allen verschiedenen Richtungen 
auszeichnet. 
Damit ist Philosophie die Reconstruction der Cultur 
in all ihren Richtungen aus diesem constanten Fak-
tor der Wissenschaft.“ (Beinecke, op. cit.) 
tant aspect of Cohen’s philosophy, one can-
not but grossly misunderstand his overarch-
ing intentions, his and that of the rest of the 
Marburg School. Thus, philosophy needs to 
provide a unifying basis for the sciences as 
cultural activities as well as, thereby, clarify 
its own position vis-à-vis the sciences. Yet 
even natural sciences are cultural activities. 
The transcendental question, hence, is, ‘how 
is culture possible?’ This is the basic question 
that philosophy addresses. Yet culture is un-
derstood from the very start as standing in 
connection to science. Science as a study of a 
region of reality is precisely to find the ra-
tional elements in and with which man can 
penetrate these regions to ascertain knowledge 
about reality. Yet this reality that is found is 
thereby a reality based and founded on the 
knowledge with which it is cognized. As Na-
torp says, in view of Cohen’s achievements, 
philosophy has to ascertain “the creative 
ground of all such deed of object-formation, 
… the primal law [Urgesetz] that one terms as 
that of logos, of ratio, as reason.”35 
To provide such a basis, one needs to start 
from a privileged science. The obvious ques-
tion is, if philosophy is the reconstruction of 
culture, why then focus on the mathematical 
natural sciences and not some other cultural 
formation, such as art or religion? Answering 
this question leads immediately to Cohen’s 
focus on Kant’s critique of reason that he sees 
as having developed most importantly 
through Kant’s study of Newton.36 Kant was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Natorp 1912, pp. 196 f. 
36 Cf. the famous apodictic statement (KTE3, 94): 
“Die transzendentale Methode [Kants] ist in dem 	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intrigued by Newton’s sketch of mathemati-
cal science because he saw this as a remedy 
against Skepticism. There exists truth, and 
this is found in pure mathematics, and, a forti-
ori, in natural science modeled on the former. 
Indeed, science of nature the way Newton 
sketched it is of the utmost exactitude due to 
Newton’s focus on mathematics as the meth-
odology of the science of nature. However, 
this is possible for Newton because there is a 
fundamental correlation between mathemat-
ics, as an operation of human reason, and na-
ture as object domain of cognition, a domain 
that conforms to reason. Reason has to do 
with establishing laws, and these are most 
immediately available in mathematical natu-
ral science. Kant’s guiding question was, 
‘how is this possible?’ More precisely: How is 
it possible to have objective, exact knowledge 
of something that is external to us? How are 
we able to ascertain laws of nature? Purifying 
reason of any empirical elements is parallel to 
Newton’s attempt to strip nature of any intui-
tive qualities or subjective impressions and 
reduce it to its pure elements: mathematical 
laws. 
Therefore Kant’s philosophy was the ulti-
mate attempt to not only provide a philoso-
phical foundation and justification of science, 
but thereby to determine the scientific charac-
ter of philosophy itself. Kant’s system as an 
attempt at this marks the world-historical im-
portance of Kant. As Cassirer asserts, com-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nachdenken über die Philosophiae naturalis principia 
mathematica entstanden.“ In the following, Kants 
Theorie der Erfahrung will be quoted as “KTE” and 
I will be quoting from the third edition. 
menting on Cohen, “in the system of Kant 
the actual vital question [Schicksalsfrage] of 
philosophy as such becomes decided: the 
question as to the relation of philosophy and 
science.”37 Thus it is clear what philosophy 
can not be: it cannot be another science; to let 
philosophical questions be taken over by par-
ticular sciences is a sellout of the purpose and 
task of science. As scientific philosophy it 
must provide the basis and foundation for 
culture, a culture, however, that becomes 
manifest as culture in its cultural activities of 
which mathematical natural science is the 
highest, since it provides us with exact knowl-
edge of the world as we experience it. But lay-
ing the foundations of culture as such, in 
turn, brings philosophy back into the position 
of being the mother of all sciences. However, 
based since Kant on the Copernican turn, this 
role is carried out in critical fashion as clarify-
ing the conditions of possibility of scientific 
cognition.  
In this sense, philosophy must come forth 
as a foundational science, and that means, as 
laying ultimate foundations. Philosophy’s 
function as “foundationalism” (Letztbe-
gründung) has also been misunderstood for 
the most part. Philosophy, according to 
Cohen, must come forth as a critical idealism, 
as foundational discipline for these cultural 
activities, starting with mathematical natural 
science, but thereby observe the character of 
the respective science. Philosophy must be 
foundational — letzt-begründend — but in a 
critical way as for the first time laying the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 120. 
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foundations of science, and that means in sci-
entific cognition itself. As opposed to meta-
physics as a science of foundations (Grundla-
genwissenschaft), where these foundations are 
fixed and unquestioned axioms or principles, 
critical idealism must be a science of laying 
foundations (Grundlegungswissenschaft) by 
providing the critical justification for the 
cognition that is accumulated in science. 
These foundations are expressed in basic 
judgments that express synthetic a priori 
principles of cognition. These foundations 
are, however, in constant reinterpretation and 
re-grounding, since the sciences progress and 
deepen their knowledge of the world, while 
also constantly testing and revising their own 
foundations. This is why philosophy, the way 
Cohen sees it, is a method of laying founda-
tions, not a discipline of first unshakable prin-
ciples, but a reflection establishing basic con-
cepts that ground and strengthen the sciences, 
thereby providing a launching pad for further 
inquiry. This is the genuine philosophical as-
pect of science; the moment the scientist re-
flects on the foundations of her science, she is 
no longer merely a scientist. Yet the scientist 
needs help from the philosopher who pro-
vides a transcendental critique of these scien-
tific findings. Philosophy as a discipline of 
laying foundations is hence a methodological 
justification of the sciences’ results by laying 
the grounds that make possible the types of 
cognition that are ascertained in the multitude 
of scientific inquiries as disciplines that ascer-
tain truths about the world as we know it (as 
cognized). However, only in mathematical 
natural science do these truths have the char-
acter of laws, not just empirical rules. Hence, 
what renders mathematical natural science 
different from other cultural activities, and 
which is the reason why Cohen favors them, 
is that the latter purports to ascertain truth of 
general and universal character; these laws are 
valid a priori. Laying the grounds for these 
rigorous scientific activities is, hence, of the 
highest value for culture as such. 
Critical philosophy is thus not simply epis-
temology—Erkenntnistheorie, theory of cog-
nition—but, as Cohen calls it, Erk-
enntniskritik, epistemic critique of the cogni-
tion gained in science, and it is directed “ex-
clusively at the content of cognition”38 that is 
purely logical (a priori) and not the psycho-
logical means of attaining it. This marks 
Cohen’s clear anti-psychologistic bent that is 
maintained to the point that he deems any in-
vestigation into the subjective elements in-
volved in science as a sign of “immaturity.”39 
This marks the path of Kant’s own matura-
tion process from the A to the B Deduction, 
the latter of which increasingly eliminates 
subjective elements. Philosophy’s task is to 
scrutinize the truths of science as they have 
been constituted by the scientists in their 
laboratories. These are, to Cohen, the most 
salient aspects of culture.40 This is why, based 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Infinitesimalmethode, p. 53. 
39 KTE, p. 103. 
40 In Natorp’s text on the Marburg School from 
which was already quoted, Natorp continues: phi-
losophy has to “zum Faktum den Grund der 
‘Möglichkeit’ und damit den ‘Rechtsgrund’ 
nachzuweisen, das heisst: eben den Gesetzesgrund, 
die Einheit des Logos, der Ratio in all solcher schaf-
fenden Tat der Kultur aufzuzeigen und zur Reinheit 
herauszuarbeiten” (Natorp 1912, pp. 196 f.). 
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on Cohen’s overall view of culture and phi-
losophy’s position in culture, the factum 
where philosophy begins its work cannot be 
the mere factum of prescientific experience 
but the factum of science. The slogan “the fac-
tum is the factum of the sciences” (“das Fak-
tum ist das Faktum der Wissenschaft”), how-
ever, must be understood in this broad under-
standing of science. Science is not just natural 
science, but science is cognition of the world, 
both that of nature and culture, and philoso-
phy must make its beginning from the multi-
tude of scientific activities, while taking its 
specific point of departure in the reconstruc-
tion of theoretical cognition from the natural-
mathematical sciences, and unify them into a 
general interpretation of what goes on in 
these edifices. As such, philosophy does not 
come after the fact and, as it were, clean up 
the mess that the scientists have left after do-
ing their work (as their handmaiden). In-
stead, it first of all lays the foundations that 
make possible scientific cognition: these are 
the foundations of cognition itself. In clarify-
ing the conditions of possibility of cognition 
in the sciences, critical philosophy first of all 
provides the basis for scientific deed. This 
task, however, can only be achieved in con-
stant interaction with the sciences. The fac-
tum is accepted—Cohen has the highest ad-
miration for the impressive work of the scien-
tists—but it is thereby anew turned into a 
task for philosophy. In Cassirer’s words, 
Cohen “accepts without restrictions the fac-
tum of science as foundation; but he trans-
forms this factum, with Kant, again into a 
problem.”41  
Philosophical questioning in general, 
hence, must commence from an already exist-
ing, established science. In developing his 
critical method Kant started out from the cut-
ting edge of natural science of his day, New-
tonian physics. It is here where Kant found 
an exactitude and rigor that was found in no 
other science. “The transcendental method 
came about in [Kant’s] reflections on the Phi-
losophiae naturalis principia mathematica.”42 
This was the factum of science that marked 
the outset of Kant’s system. Newtonian phys-
ics is not the only type of cognition, but it is 
the most exact one, and it is here where Kant 
formed his concept of the a priori in the two 
notions that Cohen emphasizes: universality 
and generality.43 That is why theoretical phi-
losophy must focus on the conditions of pos-
sibility of cognition of the type of universal 
and general character. In Holzhey’s words, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 120. 
42 KTE, p. 94. 
43 Cf. Stolzenberg 1995, p. 29, who explains this 
move succinctly: “[N]un wird [in Cohen] die kan-
tische Bestimmung der Apriorität als Herkunft eines 
Begriffs aus Quellen der Vernunft aufgrund der 
psychologischen Konnotationen preisgegeben und 
auf die Charaktere der Notwendigkeit und Allge-
meinheit bzw. auf den Charakter der Gesetzlichkeit 
einer Erkenntnis reduziert. Daher kann Cohen 
sagen, daß aprioriische Prinzipien Teile der Bedeu-
tung des Begriffs der naturwissenschaftlichen Erk-
enntnis bzw. Erfahrung sind, und daher ist es auch 
verständlich, daß Cohen diejenigen Bereiche, in 
denen diese Prinzipien enthalten sind, die Mathe-
matik und reine Naturwissenschaft, als Teilbestim-
mungen des Begriffs der Erfahrung aufgefaßt hat.“ 
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“what is at stake under the title of a transcen-
dental theory of experience, for Cohen, are 
the conditions of validity of a priori cogni-
tion.”44 And this is why Newtonian physics is 
Kant’s model and paradigm. Yet depending 
on the type of transcendental inquiry—and 
the theoretical is but one—other sciences will 
serve as points of departure. Each direction of 
critical philosophy must hence choose a sci-
entific discipline as its factum. As Cohen de-
clares in his interpretation of Kant’s Second 
Critique, practical philosophy must take as its 
factum the established discipline of jurispru-
dence (Rechtswissenschaft) to reconstruct 
ethical norms that function as conditions of 
possibility for the former. This does not ren-
der a given jurisprudence authoritative, but is 
the starting point for reconstructing the ethi-
cal norms and values that underpin and factor 
into it. Theoretical philosophy, which is 
about universal and general truths, must 
choose that scientific discipline where cogni-
tion of the highest “quality” and dignity is 
gained: and this can only be cognition of 
mathematical rigor.45 To justify this knowl-
edge is the task of epistemic critique and the 
result in addressing this task is the transcen-
dental method. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Holzhey 2004, p. 48. 
45 Cohen makes it very clear in KBE that, while 
theoretical philosophy deals with knowledge in the 
sense of theoretical cognition, practical philosophy 
with “moral knowing” (moralisches Erkennen vs. 
theoretisches Wissen). In other words, Cohen clearly 
recognizes the difference in the cognitive functions 
involved in these respective disciplines as well as the 
type of philosophical treatment they demand. Cf. 
KBE, p. 321. 
3.  Kant’s Novel Concept of Experi-
ence and the Transcendental Method 
 
s has become clear, the thesis that 
Cohen boldly puts forth is: the fac-
tum that we have to contend with 
in theoretical philosophy is the factum of 
natural mathematical science. Hence, the ob-
ject of experience is not “brute” nature but the 
nature experienced in natural science. Experi-
ence, the way Kant understands it, is not 
primitive sensation or perception; rather, the 
content and the object of judgments of experi-
ence are the general truths of science in the 
form of synthetic judgments a priori. This no-
tion can be backed up with reference to the 
original meaning of the word “Erfahrung,” 
which was historically introduced into phi-
losophical terminology in the 18th century 
(presumably by the Wolff School) and means 
originally at no point “mere experience” as in 
contemporary usage, but rather something 
like investigation or scrutiny (cf. also Spanish 
experiencia, but the verb derived from it is ex-
perimentar).46 Cohen is not saying that such 
“simple perception” (as sensation, Emp-
findung) does not exist. Rather, if we are to 
take our point of departure from mathemati-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Cf. Duden, Das Herkunftswörterbuch, Duden-
Verlag: Mannheim/Wien/Zürich, 1963, p. 141. The 
original cognates of erfahren were “erforschen, ken-
nenlernen, durchmachen“ (investigate, get to know, 
going through). Cf. also the adjective “erfahren” 
which can also mean “smart, intelligent, educated.” 
On Kant’s understanding of Erfahrung cf. also 
Kambartel 1972, pp. 609f., who reminds us that Er-
fahrung is primarily a translation of Greek empeiría, 
which in Aristotle is closely linked to epistéme. 
A 
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cal natural science, this is what is experienced 
as nature: “Not the stars in the sky are the ob-
jects that this method teaches us to contem-
plate, but the astronomical calculations; those 
facts of scientific reality are, as it were, the 
real that is to be accounted for, as that at 
which the transcendental gaze is directed. 
What is the basis of this reality that is given in 
such facts? Which are the conditions of this 
certitude from which visible reality derives its 
reality? Those facts of laws are the objects, 
not the star-objects.”47 This is what reality is, 
or tersely put, “the law is the reality” (“das 
Gesetz ist die Realität”).48 The realities that we 
are talking about in mathematical science are 
the lawful relations ascertained in scientific 
cognition. They are available in “printed 
tomes,”49 not objects of sensual perception. 
“Erfahrung,” hence, refers here to the object 
or content of cognition, not the thought-
process in which it is created. In this sense, if 
we are talking in the context of natural scien-
tific experiencing, there is no difference be-
tween experience and cognition. What is ex-
perienced is not the object as pre-scientific 
thing, but what this thing stands for: an ideal-
ized object of mathematical science.  
This has yet another consequence. If the 
object that we experience is of law-like char-
acter, then experience cannot be completely 
intuitive, but is “shot through” with cogni-
tive, rational elements. Husserl’s phenome-
nology will later make a similar point that fur-
ther clarifies Cohen’s intentions: what is expe-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 KBE, pp. 20 f. 
48 Ibid., p. 21. 
49 KBE, p. 27. 
rienced is not the life-world pure and simple, 
but it is “shrouded over” by science. The ob-
ject of experience is always at least to a mini-
mal extent “idealized.” Pure experience is 
something that can only be reached by a sys-
tematic “unbuilding” (“Abbau”) of higher 
layers. Hence, the two stems of cognition—
Kant’s canonical distinction—between sensi-
bility and understanding is in Cohen’s reading 
a mere methodological abstraction; they can 
become separated only when one pursues dif-
ferent scientific spheres within pure cognition. 
Cohen claimed, famously and influentially for 
Kant future scholarship, that Kant’s transcen-
dental aesthetic is a remnant from the precriti-
cal period that has systematically been “in-
gested” into the transcendental logic by the 
time Kant has developed his critical system.50 
Logic is the dominant focus in Kant.  
What Kant’s philosophy is truly about is 
establishing the sovereignty of thought over 
being. This is the meaning of critical idealism, 
as Cohen sees it: thought creates being, but be-
ing in the sense of the reality as just specified. 
If it is true that the First Critique talks of ex-
perience as experience of scientific objects of 
law-like fashion, this conclusion makes sense. 
Intuition and understanding are, as Cohen 
says, “epistemic-critical [erkenntniskritische] 
abstractions” or “abbreviations of scientific 
methods”51. There is but one process of cog-
nition in which knowledge is gained. But 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Or, which says the same, had Kant understood 
himself correctly, he should not have had the archi-
tectonics of having a transcendental aesthetics pref-
aced before the transcendental logic. 
51 Princip der Infinitesimalmethode, p. 59. 
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what counts, what advances science, is the in-
crease of knowledge itself, that is, the construc-
tion of new reality. There might be different 
psychic dispositions in our way of progressing 
knowledge, but these are irrelevant with re-
spect to the furthering of knowledge that sci-
ence aims at. In Cohen’s reading, the tran-
scendental method of explaining the condi-
tions of possibility of the cognition of scien-
tific objects is inherently monistic, with the fo-
cus on logic—establishing laws—as its 
trademark. This is why Cohen increasingly 
refers to his project as “logic of cognition” 
(“Erkenntnislogik”) as opposed to the Kantian 
title of critique of reason, which still implies 
an investigation into subjectivity or conscious 
processes that are involved in bringing about 
cognition.52 Reason is first and foremost sci-
entific cognition that reaches its results 
through pure thought and crystallizes in a 
priori laws. What distinguishes us as rational 
creatures from non-rational beings is that our 
reason allows us to establish ever new lawful 
connections and relations in the world we live 
in. It is reason that makes us conscious, not 
vice versa. W. Marx has also spoken of a 
“methodological holism” with an inherently 
dynamic character: “The totality [of reality 
… ] is the product of a theoretical construc-
tion that remains in principle open.”53 The a 
priori is not a fixed set of laws, but is revealed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This development in Cohen beginning with the 
first edition of KTE via the systematically important 
Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode to his own system in 
the Logik der reinen Erkenntnis is traced in exquisite 
detail in Edel 1986. 
53 Marx, in Politisches Denken, p. 125. 
step by step. The a priori itself is dynamic with 
essentially open horizons.54 
This is the constructive character of the 
transcendental method. As a logic of cogni-
tion, it is interested in the constitution of cog-
nition and the object that is constituted in this 
cognition. But note that the object of cogni-
tion is an entity of the type of a law of nature. 
The law, however, is discovered only over 
time in the process of scientific inquiry. This 
means, the scientist cannot assume the object 
of her activity as something that is given. 
Rather, consciousness in its scientific activity 
of establishing new laws constructs the object, 
thereby unfolding new elements of a law. In a 
characteristic phrase, Cohen says, the object 
of science is not gegeben (given) but aufgege-
ben (a task). There is no “myth of the given” 
if one interprets Kant’s First Critique as a the-
ory of scientific cognition. Rather, it is 
thought that produces concepts in the form of 
pure rational judgments that conceptualize 
laws of nature. Hence, over and above the re-
jection of Kant’s intuition-thought distinction 
Cohen also rejects as artificial any distinction 
between the realms of understanding and rea-
son.55 Purely rational judgments are the way 
in which scientific principles are formulated, 
specifically in the synthetic principles.56 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cf. also the presentation in Holzhey 1986/I. 
55 Marx, op. cit., p. 124. 
56 Cohen’s own Logic of Pure Cognition ultimately 
takes on the form of a doctrine of judgments (Ur-
teilslehre), as this is the place in which pure cogni-
tion becomes “objective” as crystallization points of 
reason’s constructive activity. Cf. also Stolzenberg 
1995. 
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Thought in this totalizing sense is productive 
and expresses its findings in principles that 
formulate laws (the synthetic principles). The 
process of scientific discovery is that of a con-
struction of ever new laws of nature. As Na-
torp says it in an oft-quoted slogan-like man-
ner, the factum is, in truth, a fieri, the factum 
is something that is being made, produced by 
the constructive activity in pure thought, i.e., 
in a priori thought having the character of 
lawfulness, i.e., of the type of generality and 
universality.57 In Holzhey’s words: “The 
Marburgers set themselves the task of inte-
grating the dynamics of experience into the a 
priori foundation of experience, at least in the 
realm of theory of science, where the progress 
of cognition has already rendered obsolete 
many a rigid theoretical foundation”58. What 
Holzhey here calls “integration” clarifies 
Cohen’s concept of philosophy as the science 
of laying foundations in “cooperation” with 
the scientists. 
Reality is hence not something purely 
given or that can ever be assumed as given, 
but a task that is given to us to discover and in 
which we can cognize nature. Reality is itself 
a “means of thought” (Denkmittel) that con-
structs itself in pure thought. Philosophy’s 
task is about the justification involved in mak-
ing such claims about nature of the type of 
general and universal laws.59 Experience in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Cf. Natorp 1911. 
58 Holzhey 1986/I, p. 57. 
59 As Holzhey says, “The problem of reality hence 
pertains to the legitimization of the positing of a 
something as such.” (Holzhey 2004, p. 48, italics 
added). 
the simple sense, prior to philosophical scru-
tiny, might be something “entirely acciden-
tal,” but what it constructs in its cognitive ac-
tivity is of general and universal character: a 
law of nature. This is the enigma that critical 
philosophy needs to give justification for by 
laying a foundation for these truth claims and 
by establishing the limits of the latter. Cohen 
asserts, “the transcendental method, by di-
recting its deductions at the factum of mathe-
matical natural science, thus does not proceed 
from some somehow assumed absolute, but 
from experience as something ‘entirely acci-
dental,’ and in this approach lies the pride and 
the modesty of critical philosophy, its striving 
for scientific truth and the insight into its lim-
its.”60 
The factum is therefore not something ab-
solute, but in constant revision as science con-
tinually progresses. This is why science is not 
dealing with absolute truths and, conversely, 
why philosophy cannot make a claim to abso-
lute foundations, but instead contents itself 
with laying foundations that are constantly to 
be revised as well. The dynamics of scientific 
progress have a correlative dynamics in the 
laying of foundations for the sciences, which 
are equally constantly flexible and bound to 
change.61 In all of this, cognition is an open-
ended process in which science progresses 
over time, by covering new ground, thereby 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 KTE, p. 637. 
61 Of these foundations, Cohen says: “This funda-
ment is not given objectively; yet it is the unavoid-
able task of reason; it is the covering up of the abyss 
that is uncovered by intelligible arbitrariness.” 
(KBE, p. 34). 
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creating this very ground, and thereby con-
stantly opening up new horizons to be pene-
trated, thereby making the object of science a 
problem anew. Pure cognition constructs the 
path on which it travels. One scientific finding 
is merely the incentive for further question-
ing. What is achieved in this endless process is 
a constant gathering of new information in 
the form of new a priori laws. The object of 
science, hence, is not arbitrary but is, as law, 
something necessary and universal. This is 
the character of the law as being universally 
valid and Kant’s philosophy addresses this 
problem, how it is possible to have precisely 
this type of knowledge, by clarifying the con-
ditions under which it is possible to have such 
a priori knowledge. Following Kant’s famous 
phrase, we can know only of that in objects 
which we ourselves lay into them. Cohen’s 
interpretation of this Kantian tenet is that a 
priori knowledge is possible because we con-
struct this knowledge in pure thought. Cohen 
summarizes these affairs in the following pas-
sage: 
 
Nature is experience, that is, mathematical natural sci-
ence, whose possibility lies in the ‘general natural 
laws’ of the synthetic principles. In this possibility of 
experience lies therefore all necessity of nature. This 
is the sum of all transcendental insight into the a priori 
conditions of experience. And this insight satisfies the 
scientific mind, to which nature is not a thing given to 
the senses, but rather is the great question mark that 
the senses present and that understanding has to solve 
step by step.62 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 KTE, p. 638. 
In accordance with this reading, Cohen pre-
sents an original interpretation of Kant’s thing 
in itself. If the object of the sciences is pro-
duced and in constant flux of refinement, veri-
fication, augmentation, then there can no 
longer be a strict distinction between appear-
ance and thing in itself. Consequently, the 
thing in itself is interpreted by Cohen as a 
“limit concept” (Grenzbegriff), as the ideal 
limit of an object of complete determinations. 
The thing in itself is the systematic unity and 
the “totality [Inbegriff] of all scientific cogni-
tions”63, as science moves from the accidental 
to the necessary in pure thought, thereby con-
stantly fleshing out further our knowledge of 
the thing in itself. Pure thought is nothing but 
thought purely in its lawful form. The thing 
in itself is never attainable, but ever more de-
terminable in scientific progress; knowledge 
gets ever more “fleshed out” and “filled in” 
by scientific progress.64 Science is a teleologi-
cal progression of ever new “experiences” in 
this sense of ascertaining new and more re-
fined laws about nature. In pushing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 KTE, p. 660. 
64 As an aside, this concept of a limit idea also crops 
up again in Husserl’s account of perception, with 
the object being an indeterminable X that is ever 
more filled in by additional experiences. Though 
Husserl focuses on the intuitive elements in percep-
tion, what becomes increasingly known as abiding 
knowledge of that object follows the same structure 
of construction as in Cohen. The difference to 
Cohen is that Husserl speaks of constitution, not 
construction, and the reason for this is that Husserl 
is not talking of constructions of laws but of the 
constitution of objects in consciousness. Still, the 
similarity is striking. 
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boundaries of scientific cognition, however, 
the foundations of basic concepts become 
equally revised at all times and are in constant 
flux. Thus, scientific cognition is pure 
thought through and through. In pure 
thought reality becomes constructed, but it 
becomes constructed on the basis of founda-
tions laid by the creative scientist who is, in 
this sense, a philosopher. The creative act of 
the philosopher is the laying of a foundation 
in what Cohen also calls—alluding to 
Plato65—grounding a hypothesis, and what is 
achieved on this basis is pure thought, purely 
that which is purely lawful in mental activity. 
This is why Cohen has also been called an ex-
treme “logicist” as he “sublates” ultimately all 
cognition in pure thought.66 The notion of 
“purity” refers to the logical, lawful elements 
in all human activity. This tendency becomes 
stronger as Cohen’s system progresses. Char-
acteristically, his own theoretical work in par-
allel to Kant’s First Critique is called Logic of 
Pure Cognition, where all the purity of cogni-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 A hypothesis is famously introduced in the dia-
logue Meno, where Socrates posits the hypothesis 
that virtue (arête) is either knowledge, in which case 
it can be learned and taught, or something alto-
gether different (it turns out to be “true opinion,” 
[dóxa alethés] in the end). On the Marburg interpre-
tation of Plato, cf. Natorp’s influential Platons 
Ideenlehre (Plato’s Theory of Forms).  
66 The term “sublate” here is not to mean that 
Cohen does this in any analogy to Hegel. Hegel’s 
teleological system is rejected on several accounts, 
though it has been remarked that Hegel receives an 
unfair treatment altogether, or is nearly overlooked 
altogether, in the Marburg School. On Marburg’s 
relation to Hegel, cf. Holzhey, 2004. 
tion crystallizes in a logic of judgment. But 
also his other two systematic parts are inter-
ested merely in the purity, i.e., the lawful ele-
ments in other mental faculties, namely will-
ing and feeling. Ethics is to deal with “pure 
will” and aesthetics with “pure feeling.”67 
In this pure sense and in its focus on the 
objective achievements of reason, Cohen’s 
idealism has also been called an “idealism 
without subject.”68 The subjective is entirely 
neglected and seen as premature or at the very 
least irrelevant for scientific cognition. It is 
not that Cohen denies any inquiry into the 
subjective; rather, how it comes to pass that 
we arrive at scientific cognition is irrelevant 
for the truths of science. This emphasis—also 
in his reading of Kant’s Deduction, favoring 
the B Edition—makes sense in his focus on 
pure thought and the objective, lawful 
achievements. Only in so far as scientific cog-
nition is able to reach universal and general 
truths is it relevant philosophically. It is easy 
to see how such an over-emphasis could 
prompt critique from several points of view. 
Husserl’s phenomenology, e.g., is one big at-
tempt to draft a science of the subjective, as-
certaining ideal laws of thought itself. This is 
why phenomenology need not be construed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 While both of Cohen’s works on ethics and aes-
thetics (Kants Begründung der Ethik and the system-
atic Ethik des reinen Willens) have been received 
with great interest and intensity, it is worth men-
tioning that his works on aesthetics (Kants Be-
gründung der Aesthetik and Aesthetik des reinen Ge-
fühls) have been treated as curiosities up to being 
mocked—even within Marburg. 
68 Willey, 1975. 
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as antithesis to neo-Kantianism of the Mar-
burg brand, but rather its correlative and its 
logical counterpart.69  
At this point one can revisit the well-
known and oft-voiced critique of Cohen’s al-
legedly rendering philosophy a mere “hand-
maiden of the sciences.” As should have be-
come clear by now, this statement is simply 
mistaken on many levels. It is neither a hand-
maiden, nor of the sciences, if one understands 
by sciences exclusively mathematical-physical 
science. While Cohen takes it as point of de-
parture both in his Kant interpretation as well 
as in his own system, it is clear that it is the 
paradigm exclusively for theoretical philoso-
phy, where one is dealing with truths of 
mathematical rigor, as seen in Kant’s under-
standing of a priori as general and universal. 
Rather, the sciences must be seen as a totality 
of knowledge about the world as we know it, 
in the broad sense in which the Greeks used 
the term episteme and which is also present in 
the German Wissenschaft. As such, the sci-
ences are but one, though the highest form of 
culture, and what is relevant about culture is 
the ways man as a rational animal forms the 
world he lives in. Culture is the ultimate focus 
of Cohen’s philosophy and any philosophy 
that sees itself as working within culture that 
is fuelled by the optimism of the Enlighten-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 On a manner in which one could merge the neo-
Kantianian and phenomenological methods, cf. Luft 
2004. One would also have to mention that, to Hei-
degger, this reading of the Deduction—Heidegger 
favoring that of the A-edition—was precisely the 
point of disagreement and of a fundamental parting 
of the ways. 
ment.70 The world is how it has been created 
by humanity. Culture is a great achievement, 
and its pinnacle is reached in man’s rational 
activity crystallized in science, in the highest 
form of scientific cognition of general, uni-
versal objectivity. To say it bluntly: Human-
ity’s greatest achievements are present and lie 
readily available in the academic libraries of 
this world. 
Moreover, it would be absolutely mislead-
ing to consider philosophy in this sense as a 
“handmaiden” of these activities; philosophy 
lays the foundations upon which cultural ac-
tivities become possible. Philosophy begins its 
work where problems arise for the scientist, 
which the scientist cannot answer without 
making recourse to philosophy. That is, these 
problems become question marks and as such 
challenges for mankind’s rational powers. Or 
said differently, philosophy forever turns un-
questioned givennesses into tasks to be prob-
lematized and ultimately solved with the use 
of reason, thereby opening up new avenues 
for questioning. Where scientists are at their 
wits’ end, philosophers begin their work. It 
may be that the philosopher becomes moti-
vated to begin her job on the basis of an al-
ready existing activity and in this sense comes 
temporally after the fact of cultural produc-
tion. But this does not mean that she cannot 
then creatively interact with the cultural for-
mations of her time, giving them guidance 
and laying the theoretical foundations of that 
which is achieved, for the most part, intui-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Cf. also Natorp’s summary of Cohen’s philoso-
phical scope, cf. above, note 56. 
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tively and without explicit reflection. Cohen’s 
view of philosophy is in this sense not entirely 
irreconcilable with an Hegelian idealism 
without, however, its teleological vision that 
would require all knowledge to ultimately be-
come self-knowledge in absolute knowing 
that sublates all differences and brings the dia-
lectical process to an end. 
What has been said, thus, about the con-
structive character of pure thought holds 
throughout Cohen’s entire system. In this 
sense, Cohen’s idealism is a bold statement of 
the constructive achievements of humanity’s 
cultural activities. His idealism has in this re-
gard undoubtedly and self-consciously a cul-
tural relevance and implications not only for 
the sciences but also for politics in his “social 
idealism,” also referred to as “ethical social-
ism.” The fundamental claim is: “The world 
of things is based on the foundation of the 
laws of thinking”71, and this holds throughout 
and has, and (in accordance with Kant) ought 
to have, ethical and political consequences that 
are spelled out in Cohen’s moral and political 
philosophy.  
 
 
4 .  Outlook:  The Unity of  the  
Marburg School 
 
hile the later Cohen further 
delves into this “productive” 
aspect of reason, with an ever 
more radical focus on the purity of thought, 
it becomes clear how both Natorp and Cas-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Holzhey 2004, p. 51. 
sirer took their cue from the foundations laid 
by Cohen. Natorp, for one, perceived there 
to be a gap in Cohen’s system by not consid-
ering the “subjective” element in reason’s 
activity. The “objective founding [Be-
gründung] of cognition” would have to be 
complemented by a “subjective founding.” 
Thus, in Natorp’s own sketch of a transcen-
dental psychology, which was quietly 
frowned upon by Cohen, Natorp attempts a 
“reverse” tendency. If scientific cognition, 
as the transcendental method teaches, con-
structs reality, then a consideration of the 
subjective would have to go its opposite 
path, that of a re-construction of the subjec-
tive elements from which objective cogni-
tion has become constructed. Natorp’s re-
constructive psychology, however, is not 
developed ultimately and Natorp himself 
gives up this project altogether in his late 
thought in favor of a deepened method that 
purports to unify both objective and subjec-
tive tendencies. It is, ironically, Husserl who 
takes the cues from Natorp’s attempts and 
actually drafts such a transcendental psy-
chology in the transcendental phase of his 
phenomenology, as an eidetic science of 
transcendental subjectivity. Husserl’s key to 
solve Natorp’s problem of psychology 
merely being a “reverse tendency” of the 
transcendental method is the phenomenol-
ogical reduction. While Cohen moves to-
wards an ever purer logic, Natorp aims at a 
unifying method that reconciles both ten-
dencies, which he calls “life” and “thought” 
and ends up ultimately in a mysticism that 
listens to a primal logos that reveals being. 
Heidegger, who, as usual, obscures the 
W 
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sources of his thought, could not have come 
to his fundamental ontology without the in-
fluence of Natorp, which he was exposed to 
in his time at Marburg.72 
Cassirer, for his part, departs freely and 
creatively from Cohen in several respects, 
while, arguably, remaining in keeping with 
the overall scope and conception of Cohen. 
Both Cohen and Natorp never questioned 
the principal “logical” aspect of the tran-
scendental method in the sense of its con-
structive character. ‘Logical’ means ‘lawful’, 
and so in every aspect of culture Cohen 
sought to find the lawful elements, with a 
rather rigid notion of law. This is the first 
tenet that Cassirer questions and overcomes. 
The main idea is here that, while there are 
different ways of viewing reality, this im-
plies that one should have to accommodate 
also different concepts of lawfulness, and 
when one considers this, other cultural for-
mations come into view that were impossible 
for Cohen to appreciate. Though Cohen 
sees the role of philosophy in the idea of a 
“reconstruction of culture,” he never really 
fulfills this promise; instead, it is Cassirer 
who explicitly conceives of his philosophy as 
a “critique of culture.” Culture, however, 
has different ways of expressing itself, with 
different “logics” and henceforth different 
types of laws. Whereas Cohen is a methodo-
logical monist, Cassirer embraces methodo-
logical pluralism, while retaining the idea of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 On Natorp’s influence on Heidegger’s Seinsfrage, 
cf. Stolzenberg and von Wolzogen. 
reality being constructed.73 If one has this 
broad perspective, new phenomena come 
into view: these are what Cassirer calls the 
symbolic forms, of which he analyzes lan-
guage, myth and knowledge in his three-
volume systematic Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms. These are ways in which cultural re-
ality becomes constructed in different ways 
and in different logics. And this is the second 
element where Cassirer modifies the Mar-
burg method: Cohen is still committed to the 
paradigm of reason in his focus on law-like 
formations in pure thought. In Cassirer, rea-
son becomes spirit, as a term for the general 
activity of human “mental” activity that 
goes beyond, or is more fundamental than, 
cognition.  
These can only be very broad strokes, to 
be sure, but should make clear how Cas-
sirer’s philosophy is based in a fundamental 
way on the foundations laid by his teacher 
Cohen in his original reading of Kant. Rea-
son is spirit that acts in this world, thereby 
constructing, forming it, and viewing itself 
in these cultural achievements which are 
spiritual through and through. Thus, the 
only, and most important, element of the 
transcendental method that is preserved in 
Cassirer is that of construction. This is the 
most radical and at the same time most en-
compassing notion of idealism imaginable, 
which owes its basic foundation to Cohen’s 
work. Although Cassirer in many respects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The methodological connection here is between 
Cohen’s work on mathematics in his Infinitesimal-
prinzip and Cassirer’s first systematic work, Sub-
stance and Function.  
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departed from his Marburg origins, he made 
sure to always acknowledge the foundation 
of his system in the thought of Cohen. The 
real genius of the Marburg School, and 
hence of this original way of transforming 
Kant, is, and remains, Hermann Cohen.74 
 
 
Overview over Hermann Cohen’s  
Main Writings:  
 
Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1st ed. 1871, 2nd 
ed. 1885, 3rd ed. 1918) 
Kants Begründung der Ethik (1877) 
Kants Begründung der Ästhetik (1889) 
Das Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine 
Geschichte. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung 
der Erkenntniskritik (1883) 
Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (System der Phi-
losophie, Vol. I, 1902, 2nd. ed. 1914) 
Ethik des reinen Willens (System d. Ph., Vol. 
II, 1904) 
Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (System d. Ph., 
Vol. III, 1912) 
Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des 
Judentums (completed in 1918, published 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 I thank Melissa Mosko for comments on a pre-
liminary version of this paper. A shorter version of 
this paper was delivered at the Northern American 
Kant Society, Midwestern Study Group, Chicago, 
November 2005. I thank the participants of this 
study group, especially Claudia Schmidt, Fred 
Rauscher, Sally Sedwick and Daniel Sutherland, 
who contributed to the discussion, providing helpful 
input and posing critical questions. Last not least, I 
thank David McPherson for help on grammar and 
style. 
posthumously in 1919, ed. by Cas-
sirer/Rosenzweig) 
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